The Java virtual machine and the .NET common language runtime feature an access control mechanism specified operationally in terms of run-time stack inspection. We give a denotational semantics in "eager" form, and show that it is equivalent to the "lazy" semantics using stack inspection. We give a static analysis of safety, i.e., the absence of security errors, that is simpler than previous proposals. We identify several program transformations that can be used to remove run-time checks. We give complete, detailed proofs for safety of the analysis and for the transformations, exploiting compositionality of the eager semantics.
Introduction
System security depends in part on protecting resources through specified access control policies. For example, a policy may allow only some users the privilege to write the password file. A typical implementation of the policy found e.g., in UNIX operating systems, involves an access control list A which associates with each user name n their set of privileges A (n). When a program is running it has an associated user, normally the user who invoked the program. To write a file, a program for user n must make a system call, and that system code checks whether A (n) includes the privilege of writing to the file. In order for users to be able to change their passwords, the system code for this task executes in a special mode ("setuid" in UNIX); the effective user is the owner of the code (say, root) rather than the originator of the call (n, which can write some files but not the password file).
The Java and .NET platforms offer a similar but more general security system [12, 13] . Instead of code being owned by a user or by "the system", there can be code from a number of sources, called principals, which can be offered varying degrees of trust. Moreover, instead of associating a principal with a loadable executable file, principals can be associated with fragments such as class declarations. Another refinement is that privileges must be explicitly enabled, by an operation called doPrivileged. The intent is that a program only enables its privileges when they are needed; this "principle of least privilege" [12] may help isolate the effect of security bugs and may facilitate static analysis. Before executing a dangerous operation, a check is made that the associated privilege has been enabled and is authorized for the current principal. This check is specified in terms of an implementation called stack inspection. Each stack frame is marked with the principal associated with the code for that frame, and the frame also records the privileges that have been enabled. This is used by procedure checkPermission which inspects the current stack.
The above description of the security system is an operational one. While the mechanism itself is easy to understand, it may over-constrain implementations, and it is difficult to analyze. Analysis is of interest, e.g., to determine whether a program can exhibit security exceptions when given its expected Clements and Felleisen [10] consider program semantics at the level of an abstract machine, namely the CESK machine. With this semantics they are able to show tail call optimization can be validated in full generality, and with its expected space savings. This is explored further by Ager et al [2] . They inter-derive a reduction semantics for the untyped variant of the λ sec -calculus, an abstract machine, and a natural semantics, both without and with tail-call optimization. By unzipping the context in the abstract machine, they connect these semantics to Wallach et al. ' s security passing style, characterize stack inspection as a computational monad, and combine this monad with the monad of exceptions. 1 We treat a simply typed language similar to λ sec , but with recursion. In contrast to the cited works we use a denotational semantics, which is straightforward; in fact, once the meanings of types are specified, the rest of the specification (i.e., meanings of expressions) follows easily. 2 The simplicity of our model makes it possible to give a self-contained formal semantics and succinct but complete formal proofs. For example, denotational equality is a congruence simply because the semantics is compositional. We have not formally connected the semantics with an operational one. Adequacy seems obvious. Full abstraction is not obvious, but we have proved many of the contextual equivalences of Fournet and Gordon [11] and expect the remainder to be straightforward to show.
In addition to considering program transformations, Fournet and Gordon [11] address the question of what security properties can be enforced by stack inspection. They consider a variation that tracks history in the sense of what code has influenced the result of a computation. Pistoia et al [14] propose a variation that tracks implicit influences as well. The authors [5] propose another combination of information flow tracking with stack inspection, using a type and effect system where security types for functions are dependent on available permissions. In the interim, other code-based access mechanisms have been introduced (e.g., static permissions in the Android platform) and there have been further development of static analyses for security properties based on linear temporal logic [7, 6, 8, 18] , but there seems to be little additional work on program equivalence in the presence of stack inspection.
Outline. The next section explains stack inspection informally, and it introduces our language. Section 3 gives the eager denotational semantics. Section 4 gives the static analysis for safety, including examples and correctness proof. Section 5 proves a number of representative program transformations. Section 6 shows how all checks can be removed from safe programs. Section 7 gives the stack-based denotational semantics and shows that it is equivalent to the eager semantics. Section 8 concludes.
Overview and language
Each declared procedure is associated with a principal n. We call n the signer, and write signs n e for a signed expression, because typically n is given by a cryptographic signature on a downloaded class file. During execution, each stack frame is labeled with the principal that signs the function, as well as the set P of privileges that have been explicitly enabled during execution of the function. For our purposes, a frame is a pair n, P , and a nonempty stack is a list n, P :: S with n, P the top. There should be an initial stack S 0 = n 0 , ∅ :: nil for some designated n 0 . An expression is evaluated in a stack S and with an environment h that provides values for its free variables.
Java provides operations to enable and disable a privilege, i.e., to add it to the stack frame or remove it. Normally these are used in bracketed fashion, as provided by procedure doPrivileged which is given a privilege p and an expression e to evaluate. It enables p, evaluates e, and then disables p. Our construct is written dopriv p in e. The effect of dopriv p in e in stack n, P :: S is to evaluate e in stack n, P ∪ {p} :: S , that is, to assert p in the current frame. This is done regardless of whether p is authorized for n.
Java's checkPermission operation checks whether a certain privilege has been enabled and is authorized for the current principal. Checking is done by inspecting the current stack. Each dangerous code fragment should be guarded by a check for an associated privilege, so that the code cannot be executed unless the check has succeeded. (This can be assured by inspection of the code, or by other forms of analysis [9] but is beyond the scope of our paper.) In our syntax, a guarded expression is written check p for e. The execution of an expression checked for privilege p is to raise a security error, which we denote by ⋆, unless the following predicate is true of p and the current stack.
That is, a privilege is enabled for a stack provided there is some frame n, P with p ∈ P and p is authorized for n and is authorized for all principals in frames below this one.
A direct implementation in these terms requires inspecting some or all of the stack frames. The implementation is lazy in that no checking is performed when a privilege is enabled, only when it is needed to actually perform a guarded operation. On the other hand, each check incurs a significant cost, and in secure code the checks will never fail. Static analysis can detect unnecessary checks, and justify security-preserving transformations.
A stack S determines a set privs S of enabled, authorized privileges, to wit:
This gives rise to a simple form of eager semantics: instead of evaluating an expression in the context of a stack S , we use privs S , along with the current principal which appears on top of S . The eager, stack-free semantics is given in Section 3 and we will use this semantics exclusively in the static analysis and program transformations that follow in Sections 4 and 5. A denotational semantics that uses explicit stacks will be deferred until Fig. 4 of Section 7. As mentioned previously, we will then take up the equivalence of the two semantics.
The language constructs are strict in ⋆: if a subexpression raises a security error, so does the entire expression. In Java, security errors are exceptions that can be caught. Thus it is possible for a program to determine whether a checkPermission operation will succeed. Rather than model the full exception mechanism, we include a construct test p then e 1 else e 2 which evaluates e 1 if chk(p, S ) succeeds in the current stack S , and evaluates e 2 otherwise. Note that security error ⋆ is raised only by the check construct, not by test or dopriv.
In Java, the call of a procedure of a class signed by, or otherwise associated with, n, results in a new stack frame for the method, marked as owned by n. We model methods as function abstractions, but whereas Skalka and Smith use signed abstractions, we include a separate construct signs n e. 3 Evaluation of signs n e in stack S goes by evaluating e in stack ( n, ∅ :: S ). For example, given a stack S , the evaluation of the application (fun x . signs user writepass(x ))"myName" amounts to evaluating writepass("myName") in the stack ( user , ∅ :: S ).
We separate signs from abstractions because it helps disentangle definitions and proofs, e.g., these constructs are treated independently in our safety result. On the other hand, unsigned abstractions do not model the Java mechanism. In our consistency result, Theorem 7.2, we show that our semantics is equivalent to stack inspection for all standard expressions, i.e., those in which the body of every abstraction is signed.
Syntax and typing
Given are sets Principals and Privileges, and a fixed access control list A that maps Principals to sets of privileges. In the grammar for data types and expressions, n ranges over Principals and p over Privileges. Application associates to the left. We include recursive definitions for expressiveness, and simple abstractions fun x . e which, while expressible using letrec, are easier to understand in definitions and proofs. For simplicity, the only primitive type is bool, and the only type constructor is for functions. Products, sums, and other primitive types can be added without difficulty. Throughout the paper we use true to exemplify the treatment of constants in general.
signs n e | dopriv p in e | check p for e | test p then e 1 else e 2 A signed abstraction n λ x .e in the language of Skalka and Smith is written fun x . signs n e in ours. Our safety result can be proved without restriction to expressions of this form. But for the eager semantics to be equivalent to stack semantics, it is crucial that function bodies be signed so the semantics correctly tracks principals on behalf of which the body of an abstraction is evaluated.
Definition 2.1 (Standard expression)
An expression is standard if for every subexpression fun x . e or letrec f (x ) = e in e 1 we have that e is signs n e ′ for some n, e ′ .
Well-formed expressions are characterized by typing judgements D ⊢ e : t which express that e has type t where free identifiers are declared by D . A typing context D is a labeled tuple of declarations {x 1 : t 1 , . . . , x k : t k }. We write D , x : t for the extended context {x 1 : t 1 , . . . , x k : t k , x : t}, and D .x i for the type of x i . The typing rules are given in Figure 1. 
The password example
As an example of the intended usage, we consider the problem of protecting the password file, using a privilege p for changing password and w for writing to the password file. The user is authorized to change passwords: A (user ) = {p}. Root is authorized to change passwords and to write the password file: A (root) = {p, w }. Suppose hwWrite is the operating system call which needs to be protected from direct user access. The system provides the following code, which guards hwWrite with the privilege w . writepass = fun x . signs root check w for hwWrite(x , "/etc/password") passwd = fun x . signs root check p for dopriv w in writepass(x ) Consider the following user programs. bad1 = signs user writepass("mypass") bad2 = signs user dopriv w in writepass("mypass") use = signs user dopriv p in passwd("mypass")
Here bad1 raises a security exception because writepass checks for privilege w which is not possessed by user . The user can try to enable w , as in bad2, but because w is not authorized for user the exception is still raised. By contrast, use does not raise an exception: function passwd checks for privilege p which is possessed by user , and it enables the privilege w needed by writepass. Using transformations discussed in Section 5, checks that never fail can be eliminated. For example, the analysis will show that use is safe, and the transformations will reduce use to signs user signs root hwWrite("mypass", "/etc/password")
Denotational semantics
This section gives the eager denotational semantics.
Meanings of types and type contexts
A cpo is a partially ordered set with least upper bounds of ascending chains; it need not have a least element. Below we define, for each type t, a cpo
. We assume that ⊥ and ⋆ are two values not in {true, false} and not functions; this will ensure that {⊥, ⋆} ∩ [[t]] = ∅ for all t. We will identify ⊥ with non-termination and ⋆ with security errors. For cpo C , define C ⊥⋆ = C ∪ {⊥, ⋆}, ordered as the disjoint union of C with {⋆}, lifted with ⊥. That is, for any u, v ∈ C ⊥⋆ , define u ≤ v iff u = ⊥, u = v , or u and v are in C and u ≤ v in C . We define [[bool]] = {true, false}, ordered by equality. We also take the powerset P(Privileges) to be a cpo ordered by equality. Define 
Meanings of expressions
An expression judgement denotes a function
Given a principal n, a set P ∈ P(Privileges) denoting privileges required by e, and environment
In contrast with the work of Fournet and Gordon we do not restrict P to be a subset of A (n), though it can easily be done -simply by giving the denotation this dependent type:
In programs of interest, signed at the top level, most expressions will in fact be applied to permission sets that satisfy the restriction. Later we observe that the restriction is need for validity of some transformations, but surprisingly few of them.
In the denotational semantics ( Figure 2 ), we use the metalanguage construct, let d = E 1 in E 2 , with the following semantics: if the value of E 1 is either ⊥ or ⋆ then that is the value of the entire let expression; otherwise, its value is the value of E 2 with d bound to the value of E 1 . The semantics of if-then-else is ⋆-strict in the guard. We also write P ⊔ n {p} for if p ∈ A (n) then P ∪ {p} else P .
The semantics is standard for the most part. We will only explain the meanings of the expressions that directly concern security. In what follows, we will assume, unless otherwise stated, that expression e is signed by principal n and is computed with privilege set P and in environment h.
The meaning of signs n ′ e is the meaning of e, signed by n ′ , computed with privilege set P ∩A (n ′ ), in h. To illustrate the idea, consider Li Gong's example [12, Section 3.11.2] . A game applet, applet, has a method that calls FileInputStream to open the file containing the ten current high scores. In our semantics, this scenario entails finding the meaning of signs system FileInputStream, as invoked under some privilege set P ⊆ A (applet); and, this means we need to find the meaning of FileInputStream (i.e., whether read privileges are enabled) under the privilege set P ∩ A (system). Assuming system has all privileges, this reduces to checking if applet has been granted permission to read. If it has not been granted the permission, the file will not be read, even though it calls system code to do so.
The meaning of dopriv p in e is the meaning of e computed with privilege set P ∪ {p} if p ∈ A (n), and is the meaning of e computed with privilege set P if p ∈ A (n). The meaning of check p for e is a security error if p ∈ P ; otherwise, the meaning is that of e. Finally, the meaning of test p then e 1 else e 2 is the meaning of e 1 or e 2 according as p ∈ P or p ∈ P .
We leave it to the reader to check that the semantics of each construct is a continuous function of the semantics of its constituent expressions, so the semantics of recursion is well defined. 
Static Analysis
The denotational semantics in Section 3 gives a dynamic or run-time view of safety; if a program is safe, its execution will not yield ⋆. In this section, we specify a type system that statically guarantees safety; if a program is well-typed in the system then it is safe. One may utilize the static analysis for optimizing programs e.g., removing redundant checks of privileges at run-time.
The static analysis is specified by an extended form of typing judgement. The idea is to give not only the type of an expression, but a principal n and set P of privileges for which the expression is safe. An arrow type t 1 → t 2 denotes functions dependent on a set of privileges, and the static analysis uses annotated types to track sets of privileges adequate for safety. We adopt a Greek notational style for types in the static analysis. Letting Π range over sets of privileges, annotated types, θ , are defined by
For this syntax to be finitary, one could restrict Π to finite sets, but we have no need for such restriction in our proofs. An expression typed θ 1 Π −→ θ 2 signifies that its application may require at least the privileges Π for safe execution.
Type-based analysis
The analysis is specified by the typing judgement ∆; n ⊢ e : θ , Π. In words, expression e signed by principal n and typed in context ∆, has (annotated) type θ and is safe provided at least the set Π of privileges are enabled. Figure 3 gives the specification.
Constant true, identifiers, and anonymous functions of the form fun x . e are all safe: they do not require any privileges be enabled for safe execution. However, the body e in fun x . e, may require a set
Figure 3: Static analysis of privileges Π be enabled. This is manifest in the type θ 1 Π −→ θ 2 . The latent privileges, Π, get exposed during an application, e 1 e 2 . Say e 1 has type θ 1 Π −→ θ 2 ; if Π 1 may be enabled during e 1 's execution, and Π 2 may be enabled during e 2 's execution, then application itself may require Π be enabled; hence Π ∪ Π 1 ∪ Π 2 may be enabled during the execution of e 1 e 2 . The application rule also uses subtyping, as discussed in the sequel.
The analysis for check p for e requires that in addition to privileges enabled for e, the privilege p be enabled so that the check is safe. If Π is the set of privileges that may be enabled during the execution of dopriv p in e, then p can be assumed to be enabled during the execution of e, provided p ∈ A (n).
Finally, for signs n ′ e the only privileges that should be enabled are the ones authorized for n ′ . Note that a signed expression can occur in a term with a different owner, so it is not the case that Π ⊆ A (n) for every derivable ∆; n ⊢ e : θ , Π.
Subtyping
Where Skalka and Smith [17] use a constraint-based type system whose constraints subsequently must be solved, 4 our analysis is syntax-directed. In some sense, our system gives minimal types and privilege assumptions. (Pottier et al.'s system [15] enjoys a principal types property also. Reasoning about minimal security contexts for code invocation is also considered in several papers by Besson et al. [7, 6, 8] .) We do not formalize this notion, but informally it sheds light on the specification of the analysis. In the case of values, such as variables and abstraction, the privilege set is empty. In the case of check p for e, the rule adds the checked privilege p to the "minimal" privileges of e, and similarly for the other security constructs. In the case of conditional, a union is formed from the "minimal" privileges of the constituent expressions, and the types of the constituents are the same as the type of the conditional. By contrast, in the case of application e 1 e 2 , the "minimal" types and privileges for e 1 and e 2 need not match exactly. So we define a relation of subtyping with the informal meaning that θ ′ ≤ θ provided the privileges required by θ ′ are contained in those required by θ . This is significant only in case e 2 has functional type, in which case the latent privileges of e 2 should be among those of e 1 .
Subtyping is defined as the least relation ≤ with bool ≤ bool and, for arrow types, θ 1
To relate the semantics to the static analysis, we need the ordinary type θ * obtained by erasing annotations. This is defined by induction on θ , to wit: bool * = bool and (θ 1
It is easy to show that if θ 1 ≤ θ 2 , then θ * 1 = θ * 2 . Due to subtyping, an expression can have more than one annotated type and satisfy more than one judgement. But a derivable judgement ∆; n ⊢ e : θ , Π has only one derivation, which is dictated by the structure of e. Proofs in the sequel will go by "induction on e", meaning induction on the derivation of some judgement ∆; n ⊢ e : θ , Π.
Examples
For any n, the expressions in the password example (Section 2.2) can be analyzed as follows.
This confirms that use is safe. On the other hand, there is no Π such that ∅; n ⊢ bad1 : void, Π or ∅; n ⊢ bad2 : void, Π. Such Π must satisfy w ∈ Π for the application of writepass, owing to the rules for application and for dopriv in . And Π must satisfy A (user ) ⊆ Π by the rule for signs.
Here is another example, inspired by ones in Skalka and Smith [17] . Define the following standard expressions:
The reader can verify that one analysis for cp is given by the typing ∆; n ⊢ cp : (bool {p} −→ bool), ∅ and that the typing demands p ∈ A (n). Similarly, the reader can verify that one possible analysis for lp is given by the typing ∆; n ⊢ lp : (bool
For all P ∈ P(Privileges), for all h : ∆ * , we can show (omitting types and some steps),
Hence (lp cp)true is safe in any environment and typable as ∆; n ⊢ (lp cp)true : bool, ∅.
Safety of the analysis
Theorem 4.1 (Safety) Suppose ∅; n ⊢ e : θ , Π is derivable. Then for all P ∈ P(Privileges) with
Proof: Immediate consequence of Lemma 4.5 below.
In order to serve as an adequate induction hypothesis, the lemma strengthens the theorem by allowing judgements with non-empty contexts. But this is not enough. Values at arrow types are functions that depend on privilege sets. As induction hypothesis for the case of application we require these functions be safe with respect to the privilege set Π annotating their type. 
Definition 4.2
From the subtyping, we know that Π ⊆ Π ′ , hence Π ⊆ P . Moreover, by induction on derivation of θ ′ 1 ≤ θ 1 , we obtain safe θ ′ 1 d implies safe θ 1 d. Hence from assumption safe (θ 1 Π −→ θ 2 ) f , we obtain safe θ 2 (fPd) holds. Now by induction on derivation θ 2 ≤ θ ′ 2 , we obtain safe θ ′ 2 (fPd).
Lemma 4.4
The predicate safe preserves lubs. That is, for any θ , let u :
Proof: By structural induction on θ . When θ = bool, the assumption safe θ (u i ) implies u i = ⋆ for each i , so i u i is true or false or ⊥. Thus the result holds by definition safe.
, such that Π ⊆ P and safe θ 1 (d). Then, from assumption safe (θ 1 Π −→ θ 2 ) u i we obtain safe θ 2 (u i Pd) holds for every i . By the induction hypothesis on θ 2 , we get safe θ 2 ( i (u i Pd)). Lubs are pointwise, so we get safe θ 2 (( i u i )Pd). Another consequence of the lemma is that the language admits additional constants at all types, declared in an initial context D 0 , provided the corresponding initial environment assigns a safe meaning to each identifier in D 0 .
Proof: of Lemma. Go by induction on the typing derivation, ∆; n ⊢ e : θ , Π. Throughout, we assume P ∈ P(Privileges) and h ∈ [[∆ * ]] and safe ∆(h) and Π ⊆ P , and also let u = [[∆ * ⊢ e : θ * ]]nPh for each case of e.
• Case true: Then, u = true so safe bool(u) by definition safe.
• Case x : Then, u = h.x and safe θ (h.x ) follows, by definition safe, from the assumption safe ∆(h).
• Case if e then e 1 else e 2 : Then Π 1 ∪ Π 2 ∪ Π 3 ⊆ P , and By the induction hypothesis on the typing derivation of e, noting that Π 1 ⊆ P , we have safe bool(b) and hence b = ⋆. If b = ⊥ then u = ⊥ and ⊥ is safe. Otherwise, b = true or b = false. In the former case, by the induction hypothesis on the typing derivation of e 1 , noting that Π 2 ⊆ P , we have safe θ (u). The case of b = false is symmetric.
• Case fun x . e:
, so the induction hypothesis for e yields safe θ 2 (uP ′′ d ′ ) provided that Π ⊆ P ′′ and safe (∆, x : θ 1 )[h | x →d ′ ]. We have Π ⊆ P ′′ by assumption, and safe (∆, x : θ 1 )[h | x →d ′ ] follows from safe ∆(h) and safe θ 1 (d ′ ).
• • Case letrec f (x ) = e 1 in e 2 : Then,
To get safe θ (u) by induction for e 2 , we need Π 1 ⊆ P and
The former follows from the assumption Π∪Π 1 ⊆ P . The latter follows from assumption, safe ∆(h), and safe (θ 1
We proceed to show safety of fix G.
And, safe (θ 1 Π −→ θ 2 )(fix G) is a consequence of the following claim:
Then from Lemma 4.4, we get safe (θ 1
It remains to show (2), for which we proceed by induction on i . Base case: Show safe (θ 1 Π −→ θ 2 )(g 0 ). Assume any P ′′ ∈ P(Privileges) and any v ∈ [[θ * 1 ]], such that Π ⊆ P ′′ and safe θ 1 (v ). Then g 0 P ′′ v = ⊥ = ⋆ and safe θ 2 (g 0 P ′′ v ) holds.
Therefore, by the main induction hypothesis on the typing derivation ∆, f : θ 1 Π −→ θ 2 , x : θ 1 ; n ⊢ e 1 : θ 2 , Π, since Π ⊆ P , we obtain safe θ 2 (g i+1 P ′′ v ).
• Case signs n ′ e: Then Π ⊆ P and u = [[∆ * ⊢ e : θ * ]]n ′ (P ∩ A (n ′ ))h. The induction hypothesis on the typing derivation of e can be used to obtain safe θ (u), because Π ⊆ (P ∩ A (n ′ )) which follows from assumption Π ⊆ P and side condition Π ⊆ A (n ′ ) on the antecedent ∆; n ′ ⊢ e : θ , Π of ∆; n ⊢ signs n ′ e : θ , Π.
• Case dopriv p in e: Then Π ⊆ P and u = [[∆ * ⊢ e : θ * ]]n(P ⊔ n {p})h. By the induction hypothesis for e, noting that (Π ⊔ n {p}) ⊆ (P ⊔ n {p}), we have safe θ (u).
• Case check p for e:
nPh and, by the induction hypothesis on the typing derivation of e, we have safe θ (u).
• Case test p then e 1 else e 2 : Then Π 1 ∪ Π 2 ⊆ P and
We have two cases. Suppose p ∈ P . Then, by induction hypothesis on typing derivation of e 1 and noting that Π 1 ⊆ P , we have u = [[∆ * ⊢ e 1 : θ * ]]nPh and safe θ (u). The case where p ∈ P, is symmetric.
Some program transformations
Using the eager semantics it is straightforward to justify program transformations that can be used for optimization. This section shows how checks can be eliminated from the password example and also considers the proofs of some primitive equations from Fournet and Gordon's work [11] .
Transformations that eliminate checks
First, we list a series of program transformations that move checking of privileges "outwards".
if e then check p for e 1 else check p for e 2 = check p for if e then e 1 else e 2 e 1 (check p for e 2 ) = check p for e 1 e 2 test p then e 1 else check p for e 2 = check p for test p then e 1 else e 2 test p ′ then check p for e 1 else check p for e 2 = check p for test p ′ then e 1 else e 2 letrec f (x ) = e 1 in check p for e 2 = check p for letrec f (x ) = e 1 in e 2 check p for check p for e = check p for e These are unconditional equalities, as the reader can verify using the denotational semantics ( Figure 2 ). We emphasize that this means extensional equality of the functions denoted by the two sides. In par-
nPh for all n, P , h. Corresponding to Fournet and Gordon one may consider a slightly weaker notion of equality where P ranges over subsets of A (n), as indicated by (1) in Section 3.2. Later we encounter one transformation that only holds for that weaker equality. Once checks have been moved outward, some can be eliminated. To eliminate a check, it must be known definitely to succeed, e.g., because it has been enabled for an authorized principal. We give an example transformation of this kind in Theorem 5.4, formulated in terms of the following notions concerning expressions that do not depend on privilege p.
Definition 5.1 (p-purity)
An expression e is p-pure if e has no sub-expressions of the form check p for e ′ or test p then e ′ else e ′′ .
For each type t we define semantic p-purity as a predicate pure p t on [[t]] ⊥⋆ , as follows: pure p t(⊥) ⇔ true and pure p t(⋆) ⇔ true for all t. For values other than ⊥ and ⋆, the definition is by induction on structure of t.
Proof: By definition of pure and since joins are given pointwise.
Lemma 5.3
If e is p-pure and typable as D ⊢ e : t, then for all n, P , h with pure p D (h) we have
]]n(P − {p})h and pure p t([[D ⊢ e : t]]nPh).
Proof: By induction on e. We observe for any D , n, P , h with pure p D (h)
• Case true: The equation is direct from the semantics, which is independent of P . For p-purity of true, the result holds by definition of pure p bool.
• Case x : the equation is direct from the semantics which is independent of P . For p-purity of [[D ⊢ x : t]]nPh, the result holds by hypothesis on h.
• Case if e 1 then e 2 else e 3 : straightforward use of induction.
• Case fun x . e: The equation holds because the semantics is independent of P . Purity holds by induction on e.
• Case e 1 e 2 : To show the equation, we use that
] is p-pure, which holds by induction. To show purity, we again use purity of e 1 as well as purity of e 2 .
• Case letrec f (x ) = e 1 in e 2 : By induction on e 2 , using Lemma 5.2.
• Case signs n ′ e: The equation is direct from semantics, using the fact that (P ∩ A (n ′ )) − {p} = (P − {p}) ∩ A (n ′ ).
• Case dopriv p ′ in e: We first consider the case where p ′ is distinct from p. We have
The middle step is by cases on whether p ∈ A (n). If it is, the step holds by simply by definition of ⊔ n . If not, the step holds by induction on e.
• Case check p ′ for e: Here p ′ is distinct from p, by p-purity. We observe
Again, p ′ is distinct from p, and the argument is similar to check.
Theorem 5.4
For all n, all p ∈ A (n), and all p-pure closed terms e signs n dopriv p in check p for e = signs n e Proof: Let h be the empty environment, for e which is closed. We observe for any n ′ , P :
In the penultimate step, two uses are needed for the lemma: to remove p and, in the case that p ∈ P , to add it back.
In order to deal with the password example we need the following conditional equivalence.
Theorem 5.5
For all n, all p ∈ A (n), and all terms e signs n check p for e = check p for signs n e Proof: We observe for any n ′ , P , h: 
The password example
We now revisit the password example, using Theorems 5.4 and 5.5 to eliminate checks. We abbreviate user , root as u, r .
passwd("mypass") = {because passwd = (fun x . signs r check p for dopriv w in writepass(x ))} signs r check p for dopriv w in writepass("mypass") = {because writepass = (fun x . signs r check w for hwWrite(x , "/etc/password"))} signs r check p for dopriv w in signs r check w for hwWrite("mypass", "/etc/password") = {by Theorem 5.5 since A (r ) = {p, w }} check p for signs r dopriv w in check w for signs r hwWrite("mypass", "/etc/password") = {by Theorem 5.4 since w ∈ A (r ) and signs r hwWrite(. . .) is p-pure closed} check p for signs r signs r hwWrite("mypass", "/etc/password") = {because signs n signs n e = signs n e} check p for signs r hwWrite("mypass", "/etc/password")
In the last step we used the unconditional equation signs n signs n e = signs n e which is easily proved. Finally, we obtain: use = signs u dopriv p in passwd("mypass") = signs u dopriv p in check p for signs r hwWrite("mypass", "/etc/password") = {by Theorem 5.4 since p ∈ A (u) and signs r hwWrite(. . .) is p-pure closed} signs u signs r hwWrite("mypass", "/etc/password")
Other transformations
We now give an example of a transformation which employs a weaker notion of equality than the ones in Section 5.1, cf. (1). This is the TestGrant equation of Fournet and Gordon, 5 which, in our notation amounts to proving, for all n, P , h, p, e 1 , e 2 , with P ⊆ A (n), 
because p ∈ P and P ⊆ A (n) implies p ∈ A (n)
We have proved the correctness of several other primitive equations in Fournet and Gordon's paper [11, Section 4.1]. 6 
We have also proved the tail call elimination laws in [11, Section 5.2] . The basic idea in tail call elimination is to not build a new frame for the last call of a function; instead the callee can directly return to the caller's caller. Tail call elimination is problematic with stack inspection, as a stack frame holds the principal for the current code (or, equivalently, the principal's static permissions). As noted earlier, Clements and Felleisen [10] give an abstract machine for which tail call elimination is sound and efficient. The calculus and small-step semantics of Fournet and Gordon [11, Section 5.2] allows a limited modeling of tail call elimination. Here is one of their two transformations, in our notation:
From left to right this can be read as dropping the "frame" of the calling context. In their setting it can be read as a transition, provided that e 2 is a value. They show that this added transition is admissible, in the sense of not changing outcomes, provided that the callee's static permissions are among the caller's, i.e.A (n 1 ) ⊆ A (n 2 ). For our purposes, a value is a boolean literal, a variable (whose value is thus in the environment) or an abstraction. We shall prove that the equation holds in our semantics, under these conditions. For the proof, it is convenient to use the following easily proved fact which holds for any D , e 1 , e 2 , n, P , h.
Note: if e 2 is a value then its semantics [[D ⊢ e 2 ]]nPh is independent from P (though not necessarily from n or h); see Fig. 2 . To prove (4) we observe
lemma (5) As with most of the other equations, the restriction P ⊆ A (n) is not necessary here. Fournet and Gordon give a second equation, also provable in our setting, that models tail calls involving dopriv.
Using the Static Analysis
Section 5 gives several program transformations that can be justified by the eager denotational semantics of our language. A more drastic transformation is possible under some conditions. The safety results of Section 4 show that if the static analysis derives a judgement ∆; n ⊢ e : θ , Π, then executing e using a privilege set that contains at least the enabled privileges Π would not lead to a security error. We should therefore be able to drop all dopriv's and check's from e. If e is test-free, we can then show that the meaning of e is the same as its meaning with dopriv's and check's erased. This is formalized below.
Definition 6.1
The erasure translation (.) − is defined as follows:
(signs n e) − = signs n e − (dopriv p in e) − = e − (check p for e) − = e − (test p then e 1 else e 2 ) − is undefined.
Theorem 6.2
Let e be test-free and let ∅; n ⊢ e : bool, Π. Then for all P ∈ P(Privileges),
Proof: Immediate consequence of Lemma 6.6 and definition rel bool below. 
For annotated type environment ∆, the predicate rel
Proof: By induction on derivation of θ ≤ θ ′ . The result is clear for bool ≤ bool.
From the subtyping, we know that Π ⊆ Π ′ , hence Π ⊆ P . Moreover, by induction on derivation of θ ′ 1 ≤ θ 1 , we obtain rel θ 
Proof: By structural induction on θ . When θ = bool, we have i u i = i u ′ i = true or false or ⊥. Thus the result holds by definition rel.
i we obtain rel θ 2 (u i Pd)(u ′ i Pd ′ ) for every i . Hence, by the induction hypothesis on θ 2 , we get rel θ 2 ( i (u i Pd))( i (u ′ i Pd ′ )). Because lubs are pointwise, we get
Lemma 6.6 Suppose ∆; n ⊢ e : θ , Π is derivable and e is test-free. Then for all P ∈ P(Privileges), • Case true: Then, u = true = u − and rel bool u u − by definition rel.
• Case x : Then, u = h.x and u − = h − .x . And, rel θ u u − follows from assumption rel ∆ h h − .
• Case if e then e 1 else e 2 : Then Π 1 ∪ Π 2 ∪ Π 3 ⊆ P , and In the former case, by the induction hypothesis on the typing derivation of e 1 , noting that Π 2 ⊆ P , we have rel θ u u − . In the latter case, by the induction hypothesis on the typing derivation of e 2 , noting that Π 3 ⊆ P , we have rel θ u u − .
So the induction hypothesis for e yields rel θ 2 (uP
We have Π ⊆ P ′ by assumption, and rel (∆,
• Case e 1 e 2 :
(Recall that θ ′ 1 ≤ θ 1 implies θ ′ 1 * = θ * 1 so the applications fPd and f − Pd − make sense.) From rel ∆ h h − and assumption Π ∪ Π 1 ∪ Π 2 ⊆ P , we get by induction on e 1 that rel (θ 1 
• Case letrec f (x ) = e 1 in e 2 : Then,
To show rel θ u u − by induction on e 2 , we need Π 1 ⊆ P and
The former follows from assumption Π ∪ Π 1 ⊆ P . The latter follows from assumption, rel ∆ h h − , and rel (θ 1
• Case check p for e: 
Stack Semantics
This section gives a formal semantics using stack inspection, and shows that for standard expressions it coincides with the eager semantics. The connection is much more direct than that of Wallach, Appel and Felten, so a complete detailed proof is not very lengthy. Because the operations on the stack are in fact stack-like, it is straightforward to give a denotational style semantics parameterized on the stack. We define Stacks = nonempty list of(Principals × P(Privileges)), taken as a cpo ordered by equality. The top is the head of the list, and we write infix :: for cons, so n, P :: S is the stack with n, P on top of S , as in Section 2. We also use the predicate chk defined there, and recall the definition p ∈ privs S ⇔ chk(p, S ).
Fact 7.1
For all S and all n we have privs(S ) ∩ A (n) = privs( n, ∅ :: S ).
Proof:
The sets are equal because for any p p ∈ privs( n, ∅ :: S ) ⇔ chk(p, ( n, ∅ :: S )) by def privs ⇔ p ∈ A (n) ∧ chk(p, S )
by def chk and p ∈ ∅ ⇔ p ∈ A (n) ∧ p ∈ privs(S ) by def privs The semantics of expressions is in Figure 4 .
We can now relate the denotational semantics of Figure 2 to the stack semantics of Figure 4 . Proof: Immediate consequence of Lemma 7.5 and definition sim bool below.
As in the proof of safety, we need to generalize the result to allow nonempty contexts. We also consider expressions of arrow type, for which a logical relation is needed. 
case that sim t 2 (u (privs S ′′ ) d ′′ ) (u ′ S ′′ d ′′′ ). By standardness, e is signs n ′ e ′ for some n ′ , e ′ . Thus we can proceed as follows, using e ≡ signs n ′ e ′ and semantics of signs. Clearly, sim (t 1 → t 2 ) g 0 g ′ 0 , by definition sim. To show sim (t 1 → t 2 ) g i+1 g ′ i+1 , assume sim (t 1 → t 2 ) g i g ′ i (induction hypothesis), and that for any S ′ and P ′ = privs(S ′ ), sim t 1 d d ′ holds. Then
by definition sim and since sim D h h ′ . Now by Fact 7.1, P ′ ∩ A (n ′ ) = privs( n ′ , ∅ :: S ′ ), so by the main induction hypothesis on e ′ 1 , sim t 2 (g i+1 P ′ d) (g ′ i+1 S ′ d ′ ) holds. • Case dopriv p in e: The result holds by induction for e, provided that P ⊔ n {p} = privs( n, P ′ ∪ {p} :: S ). This holds because for any p ′ p ′ ∈ P ⊔ n {p} ⇔ p ′ ∈ P ∨ (p ′ ∈ A (n) ∧ p ′ = p)
by def ⊔ n ⇔ chk(p ′ , n, P ′ ::
logic and sets ⇔ p ′ ∈ privs( n, P ′ ∪ {p} :: S ) defs chk and privs
• Case check p for e: Both semantics are conditional; the condition in one case is p ∈ P ′ and in the other case chk(p, S ), and these are equivalent conditions by assumption P ′ = privs(S ) for the Lemma. In case the condition is true, the result holds by induction, which applies because for both semantics the security arguments for e are unchanged. If the condition is false, the result holds because both semantics are ⋆ and sim t ⋆ ⋆.
• Case test p then e 1 else e 2 : Similar to the case for check.
Conclusion
Our work was motivated by the hope, inspired by discussions with Dave Schmidt, for more principled semantics of static analyses presented in the form of type and effect systems. Our work serves to demonstrate two attractive features of denotational semantics, which a decade ago seemed largely eclipsed by operational semantics. The first is proof of program equalities via equational reasoning on denotations. The second is logical relations, defined by structural recursion on types. We are glad for the opportunity to demonstrate the utility of denotational semantics while celebrating the contributions of Dave Schmidt, so adept a practitioner of all forms of semantic modeling.
